Special Autonomy and Regional Explanation in Papua Land

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Abstract—Since the birth or issuance of Law Number 21 of 2001 concerning special autonomy for the Papua Province and West Papua Province, for 25 (twenty five) years in the life of the people in this Special Autonomy era, the Papuan people have lived and experienced prolonged conflicts. Because it seems that the commitment of the indigenous Papuans to accept the special autonomy is not united among the indigenous Papuans themselves, because the views or attitudes of the Papuan people towards special autonomy differ from their views on accepting the special autonomy. The views of the community include: Positive views, negative views and neutral views. From this view, every protracted conflict arises in the life of the indigenous Papuan people themselves. The existence of special autonomy cannot be a solution for Papua. Even the special autonomy that has been running for 25 years has become part of the conflict in Papua. In fact, the political intention of Law No. 21 of 2001 is to address the four root causes of problems that afflict Papua, namely the failure of development, marginalization and discrimination of indigenous Papuans, state violence and allegations of human rights violations, as well as the history and political status of the Papua region. In connection with the hectic expansion of regions in Papua, for the elite the issue of the division of the Province is like two coins, on the one hand the issue of expansion is a space for the struggle for power relations, namely the space to maintain the legalization of the government over itself and its ethnicity base through the control of the legislative and executive seats. On the other hand, the stuttering perspective of the ethnic community in each tribe in Papua regarding their elite conception which has begun to blur due to the degradation of the modern and democratic system, makes anyone who is able to seize the space of state power and become a political elite, will also gain the legitimacy of the elite.-an in the ethnic cultural system.

Keywords—Conflict, Special Autonomy and Regional Expansion.

I. INTRODUCTION

The policy of the central government is to issue or issue Law Number 21 of 2001 concerning Special Autonomy for Papua and West Provinces and the establishment of Law Number 45 of 1999 concerning the division of Papua Province into three provinces, namely Papua Province, Central Papua Province and West Papua Province and Law Number 5 of 2000, amendments to Law Number 45 of 1999, then also issued several instructions and presidential decrees still related to the division of territory in Papua. By crowding out or issuing various laws and regulations, Presidential Instructions and Presidential Decrees regarding the division of regencies, cities and provinces in Papua. However, as a result, there were successful expansions and some failed, such as the expansion of the Province of Central Irian Jaya (now Central Papua) including the thwarting of division which is still being discussed.

Even today, the indigenous Papuans consider it a failure and not a success because the indigenous Papuans assess and admit that the special autonomy funds are so large that the trillions budgeted by the state do not reach the lowest levels of society. Because it is suspected that such large funds were misused by the local government, so that the small community did not get anything. With the existence of special autonomy for Papua as well as the division of the region which led to a prolonged conflict which resulted in the death of not a few people. The division conflict occurred in 2003 in Mimika Regency, and in 2013 it occurred in Wamena Regency. In 2011-2012 conflicts for regional head elections occurred in the new expansion areas of Puncak Regency and Tolikara Regency. The impact of these conflicts claimed dozens of lives, damaged public property, and so on. Therefore, the teaching-learning process was forced to stop temporally. This happens because of the many formations of regional divisions in Papua, it is suspected that the existence of division is not the progress of Papua but the interests of a group of people and groups. It is with the spirit of regional expansion that local leaders want to pursue the seats of regent, mayor and governor to occupy the expansion area. These interests certainly compete to win the voice of the community or take advantage of the community, then develop approaches in obtaining votes to occupy these positions. This is what often appears what is called a political conflict which then leads to inter-ethnic conflict (Kum, 2013).

II. RESEARCH METHOD

Based on the problems that we have raised, this research uses a descriptive qualitative approach. In this study, researchers used descriptive research methods, namely trying to find an understanding of meaning based on facts or facts that occurred in Papua Province, related to the special autonomy conflict and regional expansion in Papua, a solution or a way out to solve the problem at hand. Then accelerate development and reduce any prolonged conflicts in Papua.

In this paper, the author tries to collect data from various sources, including conducting interviews with indigenous Papuans, participating in live broadcasts in public discussions with Papuan leaders, library books, reports, results of previous research, statements of statements, laws, government regulations, decisions, experiences, whether seen, heard, or felt, in print and electronic media, and other sources related to the conflict on special autonomy and the division of territory on the island of Papua.

Collecting data through two sources, namely primary data sources and secondary data sources. One approach to collecting data through primary data sources is to conduct direct interviews with indigenous Papuans, related to the special
autonomy conflict and regional expansion in Papua, taking place from 2002 to 2020. Meanwhile, secondary data collection is not direct, but intermediaries or existing data. For example, the results of previous research, books, reports, articles, journals, official regulations from the government and so on (Kum, 2015: 14).

III. DISCUSSION

1. Special Autonomy and Regional Expansion

The history of the expansion and Special Autonomy of Papua began with the issuance of 2 laws that did not work at all, namely Law Number 45 of 1999 concerning the division of Papua Province into three provinces, namely Papua Province, Central Papua Province and West Papua Province and Law Number 5 Year 2000. After failing to enact the two laws and to quell the struggle for Papuan nationalism for independence, the Indonesian government issued Law Number 21 of 2001 concerning the Special Autonomy of the Papua Province which was signed by the then President of Indonesia, Megawati Soekarnoputri and came into force on 21 November 2001. Article 76 of the Special Autonomy Law states: “The division of Papua Province into Provinces is carried out with the approval of the Papuan People's Assembly and the Papuan People's Legislative Assembly after paying serious attention to socio-cultural unity, readiness of human resources and economic capacity, and developments in future.”

Not long after the implementation of the Special Autonomy Law, the Indonesian government through its President issued Presidential Instruction No. 1 of 2003 to re-enact Law No. 45 of 1999 concerning the establishment of Central Irian Jaya Province, West Irian Jaya Province, Paniai Regency, Mimika Regency, Puncak Regency. Jaya and Sorong City. The division continues, until today in Papua 36 districts/cities, three times the number of districts/cities before the reform. The massive expansion process certainly violates Article 76 of the Special Autonomy Law and eliminates the roles of the Papuan People's Assembly and the Papuan People's Representative Council.

The process of special autonomy and the expansion of Papua aspires to greater autonomy for Papuan communities and their institutions. Another idea for the expansion of Papua was from Freddy Numberi and JRG. Djopari in his main thoughts about the expansion of the Papua Province is to facilitate and shorten the span of government control, implementation of reforms and development of services and community development and above all to improve people's welfare. (Hommers, 2003: 18) Equally important is that Otsus and pemekaran offer a greater share of the absorption of Papua's resources, including 70% of the oil and gas industry and 80% of mining businesses. In addition, special autonomy involves special funds that benefit rural communities for a period of 20 years. (Sumule, 2003; Timmer, 2007).

The special autonomy and expansion carried out by the Indonesian government for post-reform Papua are very thick with the nuances of distorting the goals of the Free Papua liberation movements. Thus, special autonomy is a transitional moment from the Indonesian government which is experiencing a crisis and its authority is very weak. Pressure from the Free Papua liberation movement made the Indonesian government interested in reinforcing its authority through special autonomy and regional expansion. So concessions were made so that Papua remains part of the integrity of the Indonesian state (Widjojo et al, 2009). Another perspective is from Timmer's study (2007) which shows how expansion as a process of breaking power eventually leads to the contestation of local officials to acknowledge local demands to become masters of their own land. In addition, commemorate the political elite who are hungry for power are getting worse. The shadow of special autonomy and regional expansion is the birth of new positions for civil servants, the launch of budgets and projects further strengthens the desire of local officials to support expansion. In the end what happened was the arena of battle for the arena of power among the government (bureaucracy) and of course natural resources involving local identities in Papua.

The other side of special autonomy and expansion that has made Papuan nationalism more fertile is the experience of the Papuan people under the Indonesian government, the flood of migrants, economic marginalization, and the brutal actions of military and political elements towards the Papuan people are increasingly present in front of the eyes through the policy of special autonomy and expansion (Chauvel, 2008; Laksono, 2009) in Suryawan et al, 2011: 117-119).

The Papuan people's distrust of the Indonesian government, memories of the violence and suffering caused by the actions of the Indonesian National Armed Forces/Police of the Republic of Indonesia, marginalization and discrimination in development make the demands for independence seem non-negotiable. So to quell their aspirations, the political policy of special autonomy for Papua carried out by the Indonesian government (Sugandi, 2008: 6-7) provides a comprehensive and chronological understanding of the emergence of special autonomy for Papua. With tensions rising, on February 26, 1999 President B.J. Habibie received a delegation called "Team 100" which was a representative of the Papuan people who expressed their desire to separate themselves from the Indonesian state. In response to this request and to strengthen the territorial integrity of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, the government enacted Law Number 45 of 1999 concerning the division of Irian Jaya (now Papua) into Central Irian Jaya Province and West Irian Jaya Province (now West Papua), Paniai Regency, Mimika Regency, Puncak Jaya Regency and Sorong City. This policy was followed by the appointment of Doctor Herman Monim as governor of Central Irian Jaya and Marine Brigadier General (retired Indonesian National Army) Abraham Alaturi as governor of West Irian Jaya based on the Decree of the President of the Republic of Indonesia Number 327/M/1999, dated October 5, 1999. Policies in the above was rejected by various community groups in Papua, who demonstrated it with a large demonstration, including the occupation of the Irian Jaya Provincial People's Representative Council building and the governor's office at Dok II, Jayapura on 14-15 October 1999. One of the reasons for this rejection was is that this policy was taken without consultation with local communities.

On October 19, 1999, the General Assembly of the 12th session of the People's Consultative Assembly through Decree of the People's Consultative Assembly Number IV/MPR/1999
supported the form of regional autonomy within the framework of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, which was followed by strategic steps to respond various complaints in Papua, including respect for the variety and diversity of social and cultural life in Papuan society; resolve cases of human rights violations in Papua through honest and fair court processes. Since then, the complaints of indigenous Papuans have begun to be addressed. During this period, B.J. Habibie was replaced by K. H. Abdurrahman Wahid as President. The People's Consultative Assembly then issued a Decree of the People's Consultative Assembly Number IV/MPR/2000 regarding policy recommendations in the implementation of special autonomy for Aceh and Papua by taking into account the aspirations of the relevant local communities. After accommodating various discussions taking place inside and outside Papua regarding Otsus and receiving positive inputs, the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia agreed to amend the Draft Law on special autonomy for the Papua Province into a law. Based on this, President K. H. Abdurrahman Wahid ratified Law No. 21/2001 regarding special autonomy for the Papua Province which is aimed at improving public services, accelerating the development process and empowering the entire population of Papua Province, especially the indigenous Papuans.

Apart from Papua's special autonomy, the desire of the Indonesian government in Jakarta to carry out the fever of expansion in Papua is clear. The current Minister of Home Affairs, Mardyanto, while inaugurating five regent officials in five new regencies in the central highlands, Papua, namely Lani Jaya Regency, Puncak Regency, Yalimo Regency, Nduga Regency and Central Mamberamo Regency stated that the expansion was still very much needed in Papua. (Papua Pos, 23 June 2008, Brata 2008: 6) The statement of the Minister of Home Affairs at that time clearly gave the impression that the Indonesian government was still opening the door to new proposals for regional expansion in Papua. According to the Minister of Home Affairs, there are two main reasons why pemekaran in Papua is urgently needed. First, the condition of Papua is so broad and second, to shorten the span of control of government services to the community. Almost all regional divisions use the argument of community welfare, so it is not a Papua-specific issue. Meanwhile, in terms of area size, Papua is indeed much wider than other regions in Indonesia. If these considerations were used freely, on paper there would be so many regions in Papua.

The argument for shortening the span of control of government services is an argument also put forward by local elites. In this case there was a process of approach by local Papuan politicians to the central party in Jakarta through the House of Representatives, secretly accepting large bribes, which then issued a law for the formation of new regional units. Decentralization and special autonomy have indeed opened up opportunities for economic-political rent-seeking practices (Timmer, 2007; Brata, 2008: 8) concluded that the chaos in Papua was not just a condition created by Jakarta or a form of neglect; this is a condition that presents opportunities for people in Papua who know very well how to play the system. This conclusion clearly shows that precisely the local Papuan elite have taken advantage of the existing opportunities in such a way for their own interests (Suryawan, 2013: 65-68).

The Special Autonomy Law is an effort and strategy of the government of the Republic of Indonesia in building the opinion and discourse that indigenous Papuans must become masters in their own country. Papuans become masters in their country as governors, deputy governors, regents, deputy regents, mayors, deputy mayors, members of the Papuan People's Representative Council, Papuan People's Assembly, Regional People's Representative Council, regional secretaries, head of service, head of office, head of agency, department heads, contractors and entrepreneurs. With discourses and opinions that have been built systematically and in such a structure, the government of the Republic of Indonesia can facilitate and support the Papuan people in implementing the practice of divide et impera politics. With the discourse that indigenous Papuans must become masters in their own country, the government of the Republic of Indonesia deceives and leads the indigenous Papuan people on the toll road of ethnic destruction, namely the expansion of dozens of new autonomous regions that have poor requirements and government administration according to laws that are wild and uncontrolled to compartmentalize indigenous Papuans. The Government of the Republic of Indonesia has planted and is nurturing the seeds of a latent (hidden) conflict which will manifest into a destructive conflict between fellow Papuans in winning seats and positions as governors, deputy governors, regents, deputy regents, mayors, deputy mayors, members of the Papuan People's Representative Council, Papuan People's Assembly, Regional People's Representative Council, regional secretaries, heads of services, heads of offices, heads of agencies, heads of departments. Fighting for the position of party leader, development project packages that are only waste and the rest of the projects given to migrants (Gwijangge, 2012: 81).

In the book Papua Road Map published by the Indonesian Institute of Sciences, the sources of the Papuan conflict are grouped into four issues. First, the problem of marginalization and discriminatory effects on indigenous Papuans due to economic development, political conflict, and mass migration to Papua since 1970. To answer this problem, alternative recognition policies need to be developed to empower indigenous Papuans.

The second issue is the failure of development, especially in the fields of education, health and people's economic empowerment. For that we need a new paradigm of development that focuses on improving public services for the welfare of indigenous Papuans in the villages. The third major problem is the historical contradiction and the construction of political identity between Papua and Jakarta. This problem can only be resolved through dialogue as has been done for Aceh. The fourth issue is accountability for past state violence against Indonesian citizens in Papua. For this reason, reconciliation between human rights courts and truth-telling are options for law enforcement and justice for Papua in general.

The four issues and agendas mentioned above can be designed as interrelated policy strategies for a comprehensive resolution of the Papuan conflict in the long term. For example,
Puplan stated, in Jayapura and other cities, thousands of indigenous people together with the Papuan People's Council returned special autonomy. Correspondingly, the demand for international dialogue and a referendum continues to strengthen. Of course, dialogue is not new taboo because the value is the same as deliberation to reach consensus. This is also mandated in the special autonomy law which resolves violations in a fair and dignified manner in humanitarian dialogue. The Secretary General of the National Defense Council, Lt. Gen. Bambang Darmono, said the same thing. According to him, the failure of special autonomy has complicated the current situation in Papua. After that, the issue of the failure of law enforcement which has the potential to become a violation of human rights and the culture of violence that is the hallmark of the Papuan people and the feeling of being marginalized by the Papuan people.

2. Conflicts and Potential Conflicts for Regional Expansion

The collapse of the centralized system which was replaced by a decentralized system in the 1998 reform has brought enormous implications for the system of government in Indonesia. The demand for regional expansion as an answer to the imbalance in development for regions that are far from access to power and policies has become widespread. Within 10 years of reformation, 16 new provinces have been formed to 33 provinces from the previous 17 during the New Order era.

The change in the government system also has implications for the political configuration at the local level in Papua. The distribution of power to the local level makes primordial forces transform into a political force and determines the level of political interests of certain communities, both in the form of political communities and other interest groups. The sociological and anthropological conditions of the local Papuan community, which are still influenced by the primordial system of ethnicity, have made identity politics transformed into a bargaining power in the political arena. The large number of sub-ethnicities in Papua has enlivened the dialectic of the configuration of identity politics as a result of the distribution of power to the regions during this period of decentralization.

The disparity in development which was allegedly due to the gap in the representation of the Papuan people on access to power found its momentum in the era of decentralization, by issuing a statement that the only way to increase development in Papua was through expansion. The expansion, which was supposed to occupy the legal domain, shifted into a political domain due to the fragmentation of the elite based on ethnicity prioritizing identity politics as a tool to accelerate and sharpen the dialectic of the expansion issue discourse. How is the influence of elite fragmentation based on ethnicity on the division of Papua Province is a challenge that we must answer.

The findings obtained are that there is a dynamic of elite relations in Tanah Papua in general after the issue of the expansion of the division. The issue that was originally born of political euphoria after the opening of the Pandora's Box of the New Order was later welcomed by the political elite and made identity politics the basis of dialectics. Elite fragmentation based on ethnicity and ethnicity in such a way affects the issue of expansion because the problem of expansion is related to demotion and promotion for the existence of certain elite groups.

Legal conflicts regarding the division of the Province in Papua have the potential to trigger horizontal conflicts between fellow Papuans. This statement was made by the Head of the Papua Regional People's Representative Council I John Ibo and the Head of the Papua Special Autonomy Defender Team Bambang Wijajanto as petitioners for a judicial review of Law Number 45 of 1999, in the initial trial at the Constitutional Court.

According to John Ibo, the existence of Law Number 45 of 1999 concerning the Expansion of Provinces and Regions of Dati II in Papua, which is substantially different from Law Number 21 of 2001 concerning Special Autonomy for Papua, has invited negative reactions from the people in the area. This is a problem that must be resolved as soon as possible so that the atmosphere leading up to the 2004 General Election is not disturbed by unwanted events. In response, the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court Jimly Asshiddique said that the revision of Law Number 45 of 1999 which had been changed to Law Number 5 of 2000 concerning the Expansion of the Papua Province was expected to be a solution to the protracted resolution of the Papuan problem. Therefore, the Constitutional Court requires the widest possible information to be able to make a fair decision on this matter.

After hearing the legal arguments read by the petitioner's attorney, Iskandar Sonadj, constitutional judge Leica Marzuki questioned the relevance of submitting a judicial review, because Law No. 45 of 1999 and Law No. 5 of 2000 have the same content, and the only difference is article 20. Therefore, according to him, the problem in this case is not the law, but the Presidential Instruction No. 1 of 2003 regarding the implementation of the division of the province. If the problem is Presidential Instruction No. 1 of 2003, not the law, then the Supreme Court has the right to judge, not the Constitutional Court.

Bambang Widjajanto said that Law Number 21 of 2001 concerning Papua's Special Autonomy is politically a middle way to overcome the effects of Law Number 45 of 1999. The expansion of a region, according to Bambang, must take into account a number of basic requirements, including: taking into account the customary, cultural, and socio-economic units of the community, considering that the main purpose of the expansion is to improve the welfare of the people. Explicitly mentions Presidential Instruction No. 1 of 2003 as one of the triggers for conflict. On that basis, the Papuan Regional People's Representative Council, represented by John Ibo, proposed a review of Law Number 45 of 1999 in conjunction with Law Number 5 of 2000. Legally, Law Number 45 of 1999 has been amended by Law Number 5 of 2000, but in practice there are still procedural obstacles, so the two laws are still valid (Papua Community, 2004).

One of the doors for Indonesia to create internal conflict within the Papuans themselves at this time is through the regional head election. Initially when special autonomy was ratified in Papua through Law No. 21 of 2001, the Papuan people view that special autonomy is something that will save
and lift them from being left behind, both in terms of education, poverty, infrastructure, and from the various elements that exist.

At that time, all Papuan people accepted it with pleasure. However, this policy did not last long, precisely in 2004, according to Richar Chauvel and Ikrar Nusa Bhakti in their writing The Papua Conflict: Jakarta’s Perceptions and Policies, it was considered that Papuan figures, especially those in Jayapura, could not be trusted to carry out special autonomy, because according to them there was a Papuan political conspiracy which will later use special autonomy for other interests/purposes. Then J.P. Salossa, who was then governor, and other Papuan political elites were seen as part of the conspiracy and sympathetic to the separatist movement. Thus, since then Otsus in Papua has been hampered but not stopped.

So that this political conspiracy is not read by Papuans and moreover so that Papuans do not continue to rage or separate themselves, Indonesia has changed the format. The format used by Mrs. Megawati as President at that time was expansion. He divided Papua into three provinces, namely Papua Province, Central Papua Province and West Papua Province. Because Mrs. Megawati and her accomplices at that time judged that the expansion format was better and more functional than Special Autonomy. The main reasons for the division, especially for Papuans, are three, first they see that the expansion will isolate and marginalize opportunist and irresponsible groups who always campaign for an independent Papua. Then the second division will also automatically dwarf the political symbols that unify Papua, such as the Morning Star flag, and Papuan nationalist sentiments and Papuan identity itself. Finally, they think that with the expansion of Papuans it will be easier to manage, because if there is only one province, there will be rivalry. (Rahab, 2010: 115-116).

3. The Expansion of Territories in Papua for Whom?

In connection with the hectic expansion of regions, be it the division of regencies, cities and provinces, especially in the provinces of Papua and West Papua. It should be noted that the main objective of the most basic division of territory is to prosper the community and reduce conflict in Papua itself. But in reality this is not the case, if you feel the impact of each division in Papua, because what is happening in Papua is only to fulfill the interests of certain elites from the original Papua itself. With the aim of becoming regents, mayors and governors; By having these goals, it seeks to seek support and provoke the community with certain appeals to make it easier to get something from the community. The competitions that took place among their elites in gaining political power, this kind of attitude then very quickly led to conflicts in people's lives and casualties.

Certain indigenous Papuan elites who fight for regional expansion, then submit a division proposal to the central government, as if bringing or delivering people's aspirations. However, it is carefully assessed that what is actually happening is just a pursuit to occupy a certain position or position. They (the elites) are not aware that the efforts they are trying to actually open up job opportunities for people from outside or non-Papuans, instead of prospering the indigenous Papuan people. Based on existing experiences or the many regions that have been divided, both Papua Province and West Papua Province have experienced many difficulties in carrying out development, especially infrastructure.

In his book Paschal Kossay explains that; One way to accelerate regional development is regional expansion in order to pursue progress, because regional expansion will provide opportunities or hope for generations who want to find work. Or it can be said that regional expansion is the right solution to answer the demands of regional development in order to accelerate change and progress in community welfare.

Through the presence of a new autonomous region, regional isolation will automatically be opened both from the physiographical aspect as well as the socio-cultural and economic and political aspects to enable the construction of facilities and infrastructure to facilitate accessibility for the development of development values that must be achieved by the community. Likewise, it will be easier for government services to the community to be closer and faster. Likewise, it will be easier for the people to obtain the widest possible opportunities to fulfill basic needs such as; education, health, economy and other aspects of life that were previously undefined and have not been touched throughout their lifetime.

The aspiration for regional expansion is seen as a good approach to accelerate the regional development process as mentioned above, but after witnessing the fact that new expansion areas are happening, the Independent Papua Mission Prosav Institute criticizes that the motivation for aspirations for regional expansion is only to create opportunities for power ambitions. to become regents, mayors, and governors. Because he struggled for regional expansion, he finally forced himself to become a leader even though the weight and quality of his leadership was very low, as a result he could not do much for the progress of the region and its people (Kossay, 2013: 34-35).

The expansion of regions in the reform era has the aim of developing isolated areas, so that they are touched by physical and non-physical development towards the welfare of the people. But that goal has not yet been seen because the division that took place was based on the dissatisfaction of a few people who did not win a democratic party, were crazy for office, and people had big ambitions. In fact, the purpose of the expansion is to overcome the problem of physical and non-physical development gaps. In addition, the expansion was opened because it has a wide area that cannot be reached by development, increases people's income, opens job opportunities, opportunities to obtain education, health and others. This did not happen, but even a few people pursued their own interests.

He saw that there was no clear name for the division to improve the welfare of the people. Because what is happening in Papua is a conflict between community groups, a conflict of interest between officials. The conflicts that occur are caused by the dissatisfaction of a few people who have interests involving the community. This is what is happening in the expansion areas. For example, what is currently happening in Dogiayai Regency. In addition, according to Pdt. Socrates Sofyan Yoman, expansion in Papua is only for the benefit of certain groups or people in dividing Papuans, then as an entry point for security forces (Indonesian National Army, Police,
Special Forces Command, Intelligence) and entry for Javanese transmigration to Papua on a large scale. Papuans are made like pigs in cages, which have been boxed. It is very unfortunate for the Papuans that it has been divided into boxes and is still controlled by migrants from Papua. So that Papuans will continue to be marginalized on their land or as objects on their own land.

The new district is only for the sake of power and money by a few people in Papua, the Papuan people are getting poorer, more marginalized, and more and more suffering on their land which is rich in natural resources. Therefore, the solution is to stop asking for expansion in Papua, because the expansion in Papua is not going well, expansion has also become a place for a few people to seek interests (Goo, 2012).

IV. CLOSING

With the proliferation of regional divisions or the formation of new autonomous regions in Indonesia, there are quite a few, and the formation of these new autonomous regions is mostly in Papua, with a large number of up to 22 new regions. The divisions of new autonomous regions in Papua, so with the arrival of regional expansion, quite a lot of things have happened in Papua recently, people have not fully accepted it. However, there are those who refuse and there are also those who accept or there are pros and cons. Those who are pro-expansion think that regional expansion is beneficial and welfare for the community and then manages the natural resources in their area themselves. Meanwhile, those who are against the expansion consider that regional expansion is something that is detrimental because the community has experience that regional expansion is only for the benefit of a few certain elites and then in the end creates conflict and harms and sacrifices the community.

Provincial expansion is a must, in an effort to improve access to public services and get great support from the whole community. This situation becomes fertile ground for the elite to seize power relations. The symbiosis between the strong desire of the community to expand and the interests of the elite to expand the power space to find common destinations, namely the division of Provinces and Regencies. It can be concluded that the fragmentation of the elite based on ethnicity makes the politics of ethnicity a very massive weapon used by local elites as a tool for political negotiations. The negative impact is that by prioritizing community identity politics in political negotiations, it can give birth to the seeds of horizontal conflict.

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